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i.
The following paper has first of  all attempted to introduce and explain the pri-marily american discourse of  the last decade regarding an American empire (i), 
and also, for the purpose of  simplification, to structure more recent publications 
on this topic (ii). Based on this premise, functions and particularities of  the refer-
ences made to the roman empire shall be demonstrated for the Usa (iii) and their 
relevance shall be illustrated by means of  three examples (iv). this is followed by a 
brief  upshot (v), providing an explanation for the observation that the present dis-
course is still mainly led by public intellectuals, academic scholars or value-orient-
ed elites through publications. my assumption is that the current increase in com-
parisons with imperial rome or with a transformed image of  a rome that never 
was is needed for analytical and political purposes but endangers the self-image of  
the american civilization because the traditional anti-imperial self-concept of  the 
Usa was overtaken by events due to imperial foreign policy-related performances 
and challenges during the last decades. indeed, all empires are anti-imperial – they 
do not wish for other empires. But an anti-imperial self-image is constricting a 
coherent Grand strategy of  a democratic superpower, the more so as this con-
tradiction also breaks with innumerable republican receptions of  antiquity of  the 
american founding fathers, which is one reason why adaptations of  ancient rome 
inevitably return to the arena of  the internal debates. thus new images of  em-
pires, in general, and transformed receptions of  rome, in particular, are needed.
those receptions of  antiquity are understood as « a case-by-case, context-re-
lated and politically contested appropriation or rejection, adaptation or dispu-
tation of  possible explanations, which argumentatively refer to ancient political 
orders, their emergence and decline. Yet, it is in such contexts of  explaining mod-
ern political orders that a certain image of  antiquity is frequently constructed, 
which, however, seems to promise political added value for specific intentions ». 1 
1 h. Vorländer, Die Gründer und die Klassiker. Zur rezeption der Antike in der Begründung moderner 
Demokratie, in G. Kamecke - B. Klein - J. müller (eds.), Antike als Konzept. Lesarten der Kunst und der 
Literatur in den Geisteswissenschaften, Berlin 2009, 112-126, 113 (transl.).
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receptions of  antiquity are in this sense instrumental interpretations of  an- 
tiquity.
for the Usa today, however, ancient rome provides both an inescapable and 
highly precarious historical mirror. if  the american republican tradition has re-
sulted in a special reception of  antiquity, then it has to be transformed or skilfully 
denied these days in order to gain imperial-political background knowledge and 
to master « lessons of  empire ». 2 so the term « republican tradition » doesn’t mean 
party or partisan politics. it refers to the analytical opposite of  an empire – to the 
republic as a nation-state political regime and a framework of  political thought. 
therefore it is an extraordinary and recently unbridged american gap that the 
term empire is related to both the note of  an internal, « bad » and undemocratic 
empire, on the one hand (a dictatorship lead by an emperor, so to speak), and a 
more or less user-defined external empire, on the other.
for such cases, rome is not only the « mirror of  crisis », which it always has been 
after antiquity ; 3 it is, like all imperial projects, 4 an interpretive model of  elites 
which, in fact, is not particularly suitable for the masses. nevertheless, it can at 
least influence the public and has to be adapted correspondingly, particularly in a 
democracy. What is novel about this is not the old american self-reflection « are 
we rome ? », 5 but as of  late the question : are we becoming an ex- and internal 
empire like rome ? it is important to stress this, because there is a tendency to 
see the Usa as unique and thus incomparable with empires – an exceptionalism 
which is, by the way, a quite typical characteristic of  imperial self-interpretation. 
Yet, based on its factual differences to other empires, one may classify the Usa as 
non-imperial. so, while on the one hand, « to american eyes » rome has always 
been « the eagle in the mirror », 6 the Usa is, on the other hand, considered to be 
« unique » 7 or « an empire unlike any other » 8 – it therefore is, like niall ferguson 
flouts, « as exceptional as all the other sixty-nine empires ». 9 such contradiction 
still has to deal with what harvard historian mason hammond already suggest-
ed in 1961 « [D]rawing analogies between the past and the present » means fac-
ing « two fundamental weaknesses[.] first, it is unsound to draw materials from 
various moments of  the past to compare with the single moment of  the present. 
2 see c. calhoun - f. cooper - K.W. moore (eds.), Lessons of  empire : imperial Histories and Ameri-
can power, new York 2006.
3 a. Demandt (ed.), Das ende der Weltreiche. Von den persern bis zur Sowjetunion, hamburg 2007 
[1997], 28.
4 J. osterhammel, Die Verwandlung der Welt. eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts, munich 2009, 615.
5 see c. murphy, Are We rome ? : The Fall of  an empire and the Fate of  America, new York 2007.
6 murphy, Are we rome ?, cit., 6.
7 B.a. thayer, The case for the American empire, in B.a. thayer - c. layne, American empire : A De-
bate, new York (ny)-london 2007, 1-50, 5.
8 m. Walker, An empire Unlike Any Other, in a.J. Bacevich (ed.), The imperial Tense. prospects and 
problems of  American empire, chicago 2003, 134-145.
9 n. ferguson, colossus : The rise and Fall of  the American empire, london 2005, 15.
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and second, the statesman can always reply [...] that ‹things are different now›, as 
indeed they are ». 10
the American empire discourse has not yet been concluded since such pat-
terns of  imperial interpretation are currently still being examined by intellectual 
elites, 11 while or even because political rhetoric largely avoids the risk of  an im-
perial self-description : 12 « american leaders […] almost never use the ‘e word’. it 
is as if  they had never heard the word ‘empire’. they prefer to speak of  ameri-
can ‘leadership’ or ‘direction’, ‘the key role of  the United states’ in the Western 
‘community’ or ‘civilization’  ». Yet : « of  course, it is not surprising that american 
leaders suffer a memory lapse when it comes to the word empire. they choose 
not to use it because it does not help to achieve the grand strategic goals of  the 
United states. to do so would make their lives more difficult because it would aid 
resistance to the american empire. for an american president or senior official 
to state that america is an empire would only help to organize resistance to it. to 
say it is an empire might cause the american people to question whether or not 
they want one » 13 – and it might cause the american people to question what an 
empire is or should be.
ii.
the period of  investigation of  this article is roughly limited to the first decade 
of  the 21st century. it was during this time that three significant developments 
merged.
First of  all, according to many observers, american policy has undergone a 
metamorphosis from an « informal » to a « formal » empire. 14 With it began « the 
morphing of  the post-cold War debate about american primacy into a debate 
10 m. hammond, Ancient rome and modern America reconsidered, « proceedings of  the massachus-
etts historical society » 73, 1961, 3-17, 6.
11 the volumes from U. speck - n. sznaider (eds.), empire Amerika. perspektiven einer neuen Weltord-
nung, munich 2003 ; a.J. Bacevich (ed.), The imperial Tense. prospects and problems of  American empire, 
chicago 2003, as well as Volume 71 from national interest provide introductory collections ; collective 
representations are also offered by, inter alia, J.c. Behrends, Amerika als imperium. ein Überblick zur 
neueren Literatur, « Zeithistorische forschungen » 3, 2006, http ://www.zeithistorische-forschungen.
de/16126041-Behrends-1-2006 [accessed september 12, 2010] ; f. Biskamp, Die Dramaturgie demokrati-
scher imperien. Über das Verhältnis von imperialität und Demokratie in der Debatte um das American em-
pire, frankfurt/m. etc. 2010 ; J.a. fuchs, Das letzte imperium ? imperiale erfahrungen im heutigen US-
amerikanischen Diskurs, « Berliner Debatte initial » 20, 2009, 63-67 ; m. hochgeschwender, Die USA 
– ein imperium im Widerspruch, « Zeithistorische forschungen » 3, 2006, http ://www.zeithistorische-
forschungen.de/16126041-hochgeschwender-1-2006 [accessed July 19, 2008]. 
12 an exemption is the approval of  George W. Bush to print one of  his speeches as a preamble in 
the volume The imperial Tense (see America’s responsibility, America’s mission, in Bacevich, The impe-
rial Tense, cit., 5-9.). for a collection of  further exemptions see ferguson, collossus, cit., 1-31.
13 thayer, The case for the American empire, cit., 4.
14 a.J. Bacevich, American empire. The realities and consequences of  U.S. Diplomacy, cambridge-
london 2002. 
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about american empire ». 15 the question of  a « unipolar moment » 16 evolved into 
the question about its duration. 17 this eventually turned into a major discourse 
about the opportunities and risks of  a unipolar world. of  course, only a few 
people go as far as one particular representative of  the « neo-imperial school » 
of  thought, 18 namely niall ferguson, who inexorably calls for « bearing the bur-
den » 19 to transform the american « empire in denial » into a « liberal empire ». 20 or 
Jim Garrison, to take another example : he is less known but not less trenchant in 
the adaptation of  the Wilsonian project of  a « war to end all wars ». as president 
of  the « state of  the World forum » he considers the American empire to be a « tran-
sitional empire », destined to make all other empires redundant. 21
Secondly, an analytical « imperial turn » 22 of  the methods used by the human, 
social and cultural sciences not only occurred in europe. it included a continu-
ation of  the culturalist geo-politics and geo-strategy made prominent again by 
samuel huntington with some appropriations of  spengler’s thoughts. 23 the 
most conspicuous indicator for this « turn » is the allusion to the cyclical model of  
an imperial rise, decline and fall 24 in almost all publications directly or indirectly 
relevant to our topic. the subtle part about it is that almost no one still focuses 
on the question of  an imperial rise of  the Usa – decline and fall are at the centre 
of  attention. 25
15 layne, The case Against the American empire, cit., 51-102, 58.
16 c. Krauthammer, The Unipolar moment, « foreign affairs » 70, 1990, 23-34. 
17 e.g. c.a. Kupchan, The end of  the American era. U.S. Foreign policy and the Geopolitics of  the 
Twenty-first century, new York 2002.
18 according to e. hobsbawm, On empire. America, War, and Global Supremacy, new York 2008, 62.
19 n. ferguson, empire. The rise and Demise of  the British World Order and the Lessons for Global 
power, new York 2004, 377.
20 ferguson, empire, cit. ; id., colossus, cit. ; id., Das verleugnete imperium, in speck - sznaider, empire 
Amerika, cit., 38-59 ; id., The empire Slinks Back, « new York times », april 27, 2003, new York edition, 
section 6, 52.
21 J. Garrison, America as empire. Global Leader or rogue power ?, san francisco 2004.
22 J. osterhammel, imperien im 20. Jahrhundert : eine einführung, « Zeithistorische forschungen » 3, 
2006, http ://www.zeithistorische-forschungen.de/16126041-osterhammel-1-2006 [accessed august 
12, 2009].
23 s.p. huntington, The clash of  civilizations ?, « foreign affairs » 72, 1993, 22-49, and id., The clash 
of  civilizations and the remaking of  World Order, new York 1996 ; o. spengler, Der Untergang des Abend-
landes. Umrisse einer morphologie der Weltgeschichte, munich 1963 [1923].
24 see h. James, The roman predicament. How the rules of  international Order create the politics of  
empire, princeton 2006.
25 indeed, it can be agreed to what Josef  Joffe said (The Default power. The False prophecy of  America’s 
Decline, « foreign affairs » 88, 2009, http ://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65225/josef-joffe/the-
default-power [accessed november 12, 2010]), namely that the debate on an american decline is held 
in almost every decade. similar things could be said about a thematization of  Us imperiality and Us 
imperialism (h.-U. Wehler, Der Aufstieg des amerikanischen imperialismus. Studien zur entwicklung des 
imperium Americanum 1865-1900, Göttingen 1987), for example, referring to the Anti-imperialist League 
active about 1900, or in the 1960s and 1970s concerning the Vietnam War (also cf. r. aron, The imperi-
al republic. The United States and the World 1945-1973, englewood cliffs [nJ] 1974). these facts, however, 
can hardly be combined and do not meet the particularities and intensity of  the current discourse on 
empires, as needs to be shown.
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Thirdly, this paradigm shift was accompanied by the historiographic rediscov-
ery of  « world history ». it constantly reveals synchronous or at most only slightly 
shifted trans- and international issues and begins to view history comparatively 
as a succession or concurrence of  empires, whose historiographic cores can now 
also be found beyond europe and north america. a series of  research studies 
have, for instance, been conducted, focusing either on a comparison of  empires 
or on a world history of  empires. Both provide insights into a broader range of  
historical case studies, on the basis of  which the significance of  rome is relativ-
ized, empirical knowledge of  empires is broadened and recurring patterns can 
be identified. thus, the comparative analysis of  empires seeks to find common 
characteristics and ways of  functioning among empires. 26 the analysis of  global 
history, by contrast, describes history itself  as a succession of  empires. 27
politically and in the context of  global society, 9/11 may be assumed to be the 
beginning of  these three parallel transitions. 28 at any rate, following this global 
significant event, the quantity of  publications on the topic of  empires, imperial 
politics and unipolar global politics has increased dramatically. counterintuitively, 
jihadism 29 is not a dominant concern of  this current discourse. 30 instead, it seems 
26 e.g. t. ansary, Destiny Disrupted : A History of  the World through islamic eyes, new York 2009 ; a. 
chua, Day of  empire. How Superpowers rise to Global Dominance – And Why They Fall, new York 2007 ; 
m. Doyle, empires, ithaca (nY)-london 1986 ; ferguson, empire, cit. ; p. Kennedy, The rise and Fall of  
Great powers. economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000, new York 1987 ; e. luttwak, The 
Grand Strategy of  the Byzantine empire, cambridge 2009 ; t.f. madden, empires of  Trust : How rome 
Built – and America is Building – a new World, new York 2008 ; c.s. maier, Among empires : American 
Ascendancy and its predecessors, cambridge (ma) 2006 ; h. münkler, empires. The Logic of  World Domi-
nation from Ancient rome to the United States, cambridge 2007 ; p. pomper, The History and Theory of  
empires, h&t 44, 2005, 1-27 ; in German also osterhammel, Die Verwandlung der Welt, cit.
27 e.g. c.a. Bayly, The Birth of  the modern World, 1780-1914, oxford 2004 ; J. Burbank - f. cooper, 
empires in World History. power and the politics of  Difference, princeton-oxford 2010 ; J. Darwin, Af-
ter Tamerlane : The rise and Fall of  Global empires, 1400-2000, london 2007 ; Kennedy, The rise and 
Fall of  Great powers, cit. ; p. Khanna, The Second World. empires and influence in the new Global Order, 
new York 2009 ; münkler, empires, cit. ; s. talbott, The Great experiment. The Story of  Ancient empires, 
modern States, and the Quest for a Global nation, new York 2008 ; in German e.g. h.-h. nolte, Weltge-
schichte. imperien, religionen und Systeme 15.-19. Jahrhundert, Vienna etc. 2005, and osterhammel, Die 
Verwandlung der Welt, cit.
28 layne, The case Against the American empire, cit., 58 ; n. chomsky, imperial Ambitions : conversa-
tions with noam chomsky on the post-9/11 World, london 2005.
29 see s. huhnholz, Dschihadistische raumpraxis. raumordnungspolitische Herausforderungen des mi-
litanten sunnitischen Fundamentalismus, Berlin 2010.
30 Besides the diagnosis can be extended to the rarity of  semantics and allegations concerning 
« imperialism ». apart from polemics such as the « imperialism of  human rights » (hobsbawm, On 
empire, cit., xix) or « the new american imperialism – sorry, humanitarianism » (ferguson, The empire 
Slinks Back, cit.), it is hardly the case that an imperialist program is insinuated or that there are any 
references to the age of  imperialism. madden (empires of  Trust, cit., 9 and 63) even highlights the 
american « abiding and sincere desire to be left alone » and the « building [of] an empire while trying 
not to » – dialectics which, in turn, ferguson captured as « imperialism of  anti-imperialism » (colossus, 
cit., 61). eric adler (post-9/11 Views of  rome and the nature of  « Defensive imperialism », iJct 15, 2010, 587-
610, 587) criticizes the « defensive imperialism » as the « apologist approach » of  an « informal school 
of  thought regarding the character of  roman expansion ». consequently, there is a certain kind of  
consensus that the American empire has no direct political intention. Yet, it has to be underlined that 
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that jihadism is embedded as just one of  many elements in the imperial context, 
the more so as historically it was mostly at the imperial peripheries and at its 
centers, where forms of  asymmetrically weak warfare were experimented with 
– forms that are called terrorism today. 31 however, it is clear that 9/11 and its 
consequences provided additional incentives to dedicate oneself  even more than 
before to forms of  imperial governance. 32
Yet reducing the period of  investigation to the beginning of  this century (aside 
from a few preceding exceptions) would in itself  be too narrow an approach – 
rather, it is implied that due to the vast topic of  empire, the time span considered 
is at the same time much wider. the discourse on empire draws its creativity and 
diversity – and often its superficiality and randomness – from these huge realms 
of  experience. it should also be mentioned that the discourse cannot be limited to 
american authors alone, since it also contains anglo-american and transatlantic 
features. therefore, all types of  works and public discussions published or verifi-
ably listed or received in the Usa will be considered in this paper.
as a simplified basic assumption, it may be argued that, firstly, the entire discourse 
on the American empire, including so-called « imperial » american policies, is part 
of  a broader issue regarding the establishment of  a functioning world order in the 
21st century. Secondly, the specific discourse conducted within the United states is 
related to the question of  its internal political system and the potential of  the Usa 
to establish and defend a stable global order. Thirdly, it can therefore be concluded 
that it would not be advisable to define the features of  imperiality, empires and 
imperial policy in the present study, because the search for an adequate under-
standing of  imperial policy (or the dispute about it) forms part of  the present 
discourse.
a few authors prefer, for example, to narrow the term empire down to such an 
extent that it is impossible to find a historical example of  it. 33 others expand it to 
such an extent that each powerful state, union of  states and military expansion is 
regarded as an empire. competition among empires still seems to more closely 
reflect our contemporary way of  thinking. since « things were a lot easier before 
1990. […] pax americana and pax sovietica were able to mutually stabilize each 
other » 34 and correspondingly the dissolution of  one empire appears to some peo-
american semantics does not know or cultivate distinct definitions for « imperial » and « imperialist » 
or « imperialistic » as, for example, münkler (empires, cit.) argues. 
31 see münkler, empires, cit., 108-138. one of  the earliest examples may be scenarios described in 
the Jewish War by flavius Josephus (written ca. 75-79 aD ; cf. s. huhnholz, Kulturalisierung des Terrors. 
Das dschihadistische Selbstmordattentat als Stereotyp islamischer Kampf kultur, « Zeitschrift für Kulturwis-
senschaften » 7, 2010, 69-80). 
32 h. münkler, imperiale Ordnung. Die Governance-Leistung von imperien in komparativer perspektive, 
in m. Beisheim - G.f. schuppert (eds.), Staatszerfall und Governance, Baden-Baden 2007, 263-284.
33 e.g. « real imperial power is sovereign power ». (p. Zelikow, The Transformation of  national Secu-
rity. Five redefinitions, « national interest » 71, 2003, 17-28, 18 ss.).
34 c. meier, Von der ‹pax romana› zur ‹pax Americana› ?, in alfred herrhausen Gesellschaft für inter-
nationalen Dialog (ed.), pax Americana ?, munich etc. 1998, 95-122, 116 (transl.).
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ple to represent the end of  all empires. the imperial peculiarity, in particular, of  
this « most unique empire » (which simultaneously sees itself  as « an anti-imperial-
ist state, a federation of  sovereign states, and a voluntary union ») 35 promoted the 
widespread view that the « end of  the imperial era » 36 had irrevocably arrived with 
the collapse of  the soviet Union. 37 other authors perhaps take an over-pragmatic 
approach : « When it walks like a duck and talks like a duck, it‘s a duck ». 38
i prefer, in turn, to speak of  « patterns of  imperial interpretation ». irrespective 
of  whether the concept of  « imperial » is used to describe a political constellation 
or whether it is avoided, this does not necessarily mean that one can infer some-
thing about a state’s imperial structure (whether real or imaginary) from this. 
Yet, it is certainly possible to deduce something about how this idea is perceived 
and how it is used for political purposes. it can therefore be assumed that there is 
an ambiguity among patterns of  imperial interpretation, which means that such 
interpretations are not limited to people’s perceptions, but can bear imperial sig-
nificance and have a level of  political persuasiveness whose discursive power may 
develop a momentum of  its own. imperial semantics at least influence, shape, 
organize and structure political realities to such an extent that policies can be in-
troduced, avoided or contested on the basis of  the conceptual power of  the term 
« imperial ». consequently, the thomas theorem has to be applied in this context : 
What we think of  as real (and what is semantically conceptualized accordingly), 
is real in its consequences. 39
the interpretation of  the discourse on the American empire as a « pattern of  im-
perial interpretation » has a lot more to offer. it competes with other descriptions 
and evaluations of  reality, which may lead to it being substituted, transcended 
or completely refuted. since it is unclear how this competition will end, this will 
not form part of  the present article. of  course, it could be conceivable that this 
interpretative struggle is an imperial feature itself. even Winston churchill pre-
dicted that the « empires of  the future » would be « empires of  the mind ». 40 and 
indeed some studies indicate that the future concept of  empire could become a 
mere metaphor like « empire lite » : 41 « the 21st century imperium is a new inven-
tion […], an empire lite, a global hegemony ». 42 in contrast, there is the possibility 
that we may only be passing through another « sattelzeit » or transitional period, 43 
in which many of  the terms we consider to have been established are once again 
35 r.G. suny, Ambiguous categories : States, empires and nations, « post soviet affairs » 11, 1995, 185-
196, 190.
36 Demandt, Das ende der Weltreiche, cit., 223.
37 e.g. hobsbawm, On empire, cit., 62 ss.
38 a.J. motyl, revolutions, nations, empires. conceptual Limits and Theoretical possibilities, new York 
1999, 1 ; ferguson, Das verleugnete imperium, cit., 48.
39 W.i. thomas - D.s. thomas, The child in America. Behavior problems and programs, new York 
1928, 572. 40 cited in thayer, The case for the American empire, cit., 7.
41 m. ignatieff, empire Lite : nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, toronto 2003.
42 ferguson, The empire Slinks Back, cit.
43 r. Koselleck, einleitung, in o. Brunner - W. conze - r. Koselleck (eds.), Geschichtliche Grundbe-
griffe, Bd. 1, stuttgart 2004 [1979], xiii-xxvii, xv.
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modified in and through history. so we should perhaps leave this question to the 
future or to hollywood’s futuristic reviews. 44
if, however, a « pattern of  imperial interpretation » is just one of  many possi-
ble interpretive models, then this also means that one should not limit oneself  
merely to imperial concepts, since they themselves are embedded in a discourse 
of  alternative or associated concepts. the most prevalent historical example for 
this is the distinction between hegemony and empire which is by no means clear. 
the different origins of  Greek, on the one hand, and latin, on the other, already 
make this problematic. at a conceptual level, both terms are often confused, even 
in large-scale studies attempting to establish some degree of  systematization, 45 
or they only serve to make one term clearer at the expense of  the other. in the 
context of  the current debate on empires, the hegemony-empire distinction has 
become questionable. this is due to the fact that this fine distinction practical-
ly gives rise to those political, historical and cultural legitimation strategies it is 
seeking to analyze. 46
the same also applies, for example, to the issue that is often critically put for-
ward of  what the colonies or peripheries of  the Usa should be. like many other 
equally important questions, this one can also be discarded from discourse. one 
way to achieve this is to make the sophistic remark that « russia […] was an em-
pire ; Britain had an empire ». 47 so there seems to be no need for colonies in order 
to act in an imperial manner. as one can see, in such a politicized field of  dis-
course, plausibility in itself  does not suffice as a criterion for a definition, neither 
does truth, historical facts or moral desirability.
the anti-imperial tradition of  the Usa, in particular, has lead to the need to find a 
large number of  equivalent terms for « imperial », « imperialist », « empire », etc. this 
is illustrated by the use of  terms such as hegemony, predominance, superpower, 
hyperpower, supremacy, ascendancy, full-spectrum dominance, « active foreign 
policy », 48 « only superpower », 49 « empire or leader ? » 50 or « indispensible nation » 
44 for example, the most famous imperial-theoretical adaptation of  shakespeare and the decline 
of  the Ussr in StarTrek Vi, The Undiscovered country (1991, director nicholas meyer ; paramount pic-
tures). for utopian adaptations of  the imperial problem via science fiction see, inter alia, D.l. Bernardi, 
StarTrek and History. race-ing toward a White Future, new Brunswick (nJ)-london 1998, and J. Weldes 
(ed.), To Seek Out new Worlds. exploring Links between Science Fiction and World politics, new York 2003.
45 e.g. U. menzel, imperium oder Hegemonie ? Die USA als hegemoniale Ordnungsmacht. Über Herfried 
münklers ‹imperien›, « Kommune » 23, 2005, 64-72, see also for menzel‘s large-scale project http ://
www-public.tu-bs.de :8080/~umenzel/inhalt/index.html [accessed september 12, 2010].
46 thus, münkler, empires, cit., 46 says, for instance : « the hegemon will […] appear as primus 
inter pares […] while the term empire will apply when the gap between the central power and other 
members of  the political order is so great that it cannot be bridged even with legal fictions concern-
ing equality ». 47 hosking, cited in maier, Among empires, cit., 5.
48 r. Kagan, Dangerous nation. America’s Foreign policy from its earliest Days to the Dawn of  the Twen-
tieth century, new York 2004.
49 Z. Brzezinski, The Grand chessboard. American primacy and its Geostrategic imperatives, new York 
1997.
50 h. Kissinger, Does America need a Foreign policy ? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st century, new 
York 2002.
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(madeleine albright), etc. in this sense, these are patterns of  imperial interpreta-
tion and, in this respect, their use is not merely about « splitting semantic hairs ». 51
the struggle for the appropriation and interpretation of  political concepts is 
being waged by means of  arguments and other forms of  power. this is why when 
Barack obama emphasized that « america is not the crude stereotype of  a self-
interested empire » in his « speech to the islamic World » in 2009, this can only be 
viewed as an argument and a political statement but not as a definition. he goes on 
the say : « the United states has been one of  the greatest sources of  progress that 
the world has ever known. We were born out of  revolution against an empire ». 52 
the Us president reacted strongly to an already established imperial interpreta-
tion. he normatively dissociated himself  from it and used a historical argument 
to make his case even more rhetorically convincing. however, if  we look at what 
obama stresses in his speech this does not appear to be that easy. the content 
of  his speech is perfectly structured, rhetorically brilliant and also adorned with 
the words « e pluribus unum ». Yet, he highlighted that the Usa is « not the crude 
stereotype » of  an empire. if  obama had said that the Usa was no empire, this 
would have introduced or touched upon another discourse than the intercultural 
and diplomatic one. however, it becomes evident that patterns of  imperial inter-
pretation comprise imperial, anti-imperial and de-imperialized semantics alike.
the conceptual potency of  the term empire and related terms therefore pro-
vides both an instrument of  scientific analysis and also opens up new political 
evaluation categories. they take their place among political combat terms such 
as democracy, justice, peace, public welfare, terrorism, war, etc. they can be sub-
stituted, transcended, de-thematized or appropriated for use in conventional or 
confrontational arguments to support political interests. my core hypothesis is 
that the entire arsenal of  imperial concepts is currently undergoing a transforma-
tion within and as a result of  the american debate on empires, in general, and the 
debate on the American empire, in particular. the purpose of  this transformation 
is to develop adequate analytical templates for self-description and for political 
descriptions of  the world, since the concepts established so far seem to be no 
longer adequate for various reasons. the « conventional debate over Us foreign 
policy has reached a dead end » ; 53 « the roman predicament » accordingly results 
from the asymmetric reality of  international disorder, 54 and so there allegedly is 
no « process of  becoming a nation with a normal foreign policy » yet. 55 hence, in 
51 a.J. Bacevich, neues rom, neues Jerusalem, in speck - sznaider, empire Amerika, cit., 71-82, 71 
(transl.).
52 The president’s Speech in cairo : A new Beginning, minute 9 :20, held on June 4, 2009 at cairo Uni-
versity, available as download on : http ://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/newBeginning/ [accessed 
november 15, 2010]. niall ferguson (The empire Slinks Back, cit.) wrote something quite similar in a 
remarkable twisting of  terms ; that american empire « is the imperialism of  a people who remember 
that their country secured its independence by revolt ». 
53 Bacevich, The imperial Tense, cit., xiii. 54 James, The roman predicament, cit.
55 D. Bandow, Bankrupt empire (commentary), « the national interest » april 19., 2010, http ://na-
tionalinterest.org/article/bankrupt-empire-3454 ?page=1 [accessed november 10, 2010] ; also cf. D. 
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this context, it follows that imperial semantics is also a language of  crisis (and not 
necessarily due to any risk of  domestic crisis).
it remains to be seen whether concepts of  empire will be able to assert them-
selves for analytical and political purposes. Yet, it is evident that attempts are be-
ing made to adapt such concepts in a relatively new and creative manner. How this 
is done, what kind of  problems could arise and what opposition this model of  
interpretation could face will be the subject of  the following considerations. the 
crucial question which will be addressed is what role ancient rome plays for the 
Usa, in particular, and why a creative reception of  antiquity is necessary for both 
opponents and proponents of  an empire debate.
iii.
in general, recent adaptations of  empire-analytical approaches in the Usa do not 
primarily occur by means of  the question « Do all roads lead to the new (american) 
rome ? » 56 although some remarkable comparisons have been made, 57 a large num-
ber of  publications merely toys with allusions to rome, but does not adopt or trans- 
cend them 58 – sometimes for marketing or entertainment purposes : such a strate-
gy « sells books [or is made] for good talk-show fodder, but is historically absurd ». 59
the conspicuous aspect about the re-adaptation of  roman examples is there-
fore the changing reception of  roman antiquity towards imperial dilemma. to 
put it plainly : the question of  what caused the roman republic to fall is raised 
less frequently. instead, the question is posed of  why the imperium romanum was 
able to exist successfully for such a long time. in general, the objective is rarely to 
exclusively praise the roman imperial example, nor is it to condemn the ancient 
rome as an imperialist project. What is much more fascinating is the underlying 
assumption of  such writings that rome, on the whole, is, as a historical mirror, 
useful to analyze current american and global challenges of  a possible world 
order and the threats it faces in the 21st century. at the least in this sense rome 
persists to the Usa as a mirror not for « imitation but inspiration ». 60
this transition is even more apparent since the patterns of  imperial interpreta-
tion and their roman examples, particularly in the Usa, bear great risks : When 
Bandow, Foreign Follies : America‘s new Global empire, longwood (fl) 2006. in this context, however, 
as far as i can see, it is often neglected that the traditional assumptions of  the political-science dis-
cipline of  international relations stem from the era of  imperialism. there is therefore an imperial 
bias which makes it questionable whether these assumptions can be applied in an objective manner 
beyond the Usa. examples of  this include, for instance, comparisons between realism and idealism, 
Jacksonianism and Wilsonism, isolationism and universalism, unilateralism and multilateralism (also cf. f. 
Gadinger - a. heck - h. Dittgen, Amerikanische Außenpolitik im Zeichen des ‹Krieges gegen den Terror›, 
« politische Vierteljahreszeitschrift » 49, 2004, 726-755).
56 J. Kurth, migration and the politics of  empire, « the national interest » 71, 2003, 2 and 5-15, 2.
57 e.g. madden, empires of  Trust, cit., in German, in particular, p. Bender, Weltmacht Amerika – Das 
neue rom, stuttgart 2003. 58 e.g. maier, Among empires, cit.
59 madden, empires of  Trust, cit., 295.
60 hammond, Ancient rome and modern America reconsidered, cit., 17.
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topics relevant to empire are put on the agenda one also has to go back to the ro-
man empire. and if  they are addressed, they can also be manipulated argumen-
tatively for current debates by putting rome’s political relevance into perspective 
(e.g. by increasing the number of  empires for comparison). furthermore, the 
long tradition of  american self-comparisons with rome is now more likely than 
ever to take a stand on imperial rome, because the traditional anti-imperial (or 
originally anti-British, later anti-hitlerian or anti-soviet) demeanour no longer 
fits. the « empires of  evil » have been defeated and, as a consequence, the Usa 
became a global power. as a political reflection in the American empire discourse, 
roman antiquity now seems to have a stronger momentum than ever : interested 
players are forced to take a stand on imperial rome if  they do not want to give 
their opponents an argumentative edge.
this pressure is also accompanied by a potential to transform antiquity. Yet, if  
one merely focuses on the model « the founders and the classics », 61 which has 
received so much attention, this is difficult to discover. from the very beginning, 
ancient rome was an « iconic empire » for the Usa, as for « the West » in general. 62 
Despite all « resistance to the traditions of  europe, america today offers a richer 
and more varied legacy of  neo-classicism than anywhere else in the world ». 63 evi-
dently not every latin quote should be mistaken for an affirmation of  the empire, 
yet even the founding fathers presented themselves as being more classical than 
the classics. 64 each dollar bill depicts a roman motif, such as the senate, the capi-
tol, the american national emblem, various names of  cities, the apparently time-
less classicist magnificent buildings and, last but not least, political monuments 
such as the Jefferson memorial which was purposefully designed to be reminiscent 
of  hadrian’s pantheon in rome. some cavaliers, aristocratic southerners of  the 
19th century, even tried to trace their ancestral lineage back to antiquity. 65
61 c.J. richard, The Founders and the classics. Greece, rome, and the American enlightenment, cam-
bridge (ma) 1994.
62 chua, Day of  empire, cit., 29 ; cf. a. Demandt, Die klassische Antike in Amerika, in p. Gassert - 
D. Junker - W. mausbach - m. thunert (eds.), Was Amerika ausmacht. multidisziplinäre perspektiven, 
stuttgart 2009, 33-45 ; G. ferrero, Ancient rome and modern America. A comparative Study of  morals and 
manners, new York (nY)-london 1914 ; D. hannemann, Klassische Antike und amerikanische identitäts-
konstruktion : Untersuchungen zu Festreden der revolutionszeit und der frühen republik 1770-1815, paderborn 
2008 ; r. hingley (ed.), images of  rome. perceptions of  ancient rome in europe and the United States in 
the modern Age, ann arbor (mi) 2001 ; c.W. Kallendorf, A companion to the classical Tradition, malden 
(ma) 2007 ; m. malamud, Ancient rome and modern America, oxford 2008 ; J. Urzidil, Amerika und die 
Antike, Zürich 1964 ; W.l. Vance, America’s rome, 2 Vol., new haven (ct) 1989/90 ; c. Winterer, The 
culture of  classicism : Ancient Greece and rome in American intellectual Life, 1780-1910, Baltimore (mD) 
2004 ; G.s. Wood, The creation of  the American republic 1776-1787, chapel hill (nc) 1969.
63 s.l. Dyson, rome in America, in r. hingley (ed.), images of  rome. perceptions of  ancient rome in 
europe and the United States in the modern Age, ann arbor (mi) 2001, 57-69, 59.
64 e. shalev, Ancient masks, American Fathers : classical pseudonyms During the American revolution 
and early republic, « Journal of  the early republic » 23, 2003, 151-172 ; m. sellers, American republican-
ism. roman ideology in the United States constitution, Basingstoke 1994.
65 cf. W. schivelbusch, Die Kultur der niederlage. Der amerikanische Süden 1865, Frankreich 1871, 
Deutschland 1918, frankfurt/m. 2003, 63.
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these days, however, it is difficult to derive clear path dependencies from this 
american traditions. there is too little socio-political familiarity with the antiqui-
ty to be able to draw clear, cohesive conclusions about the transforming discourse 
on the reception of  antiquity, which supposedly started with the founding fathers 
and continues until today. even the education of  political and intellectual elites 
does not occur in an aristocratic manner in (post)modern mass democracies, but, 
at least ideally, in a meritocratic fashion. this has replaced old-europe’s aristo-
cratic and humanistic education traditions of  the generation of  the founding 
fathers which were influenced by the classical period. 66 these days, even know- 
ledge of  the antiquity that has already been adapted and derived directly from 
historical sources cannot be regarded as completely self-evident. Yet, this is indis-
pensable if  one seeks rhetorically to refer to examples from classical antiquity and 
to present them to a modern-day audience. as a consequence, references to the 
antiquity have continuously decreased in political rhetoric. 67 the few prominent 
americans, such as Gore Vidal or West Virginia’s late former senator robert c. 
Byrd, who have presented themselves as being completely « classical » are seen as 
absolute exceptions. 68
this may lead to the usual criticism of  an apparent or real cultural decline. 
however, it bears a huge potential for the American empire discourse to see rome 
in a new light – quite similar to the view of  the founding fathers, though emanci-
pated from them. hannah arendt already pointed out that the founding fathers 
did not wish for a « new rome », but for an interpretation « in a new light ». 69 pre-
cisely because of  the current arbitrary interpretation of  ancient rome as merely 
the « iconic empire » of  the Usa, it is possible to forget that the american revo-
lution and the founding fathers « transcend[ed] antiquity in the demeanour of  
ancient founders, thus affirming the global historical relevance of  the american 
renewed foundation » since they « received – and dismissed antiquity ». 70
the question « Why rome ? » is therefore a lot more complex than the mere ref-
erence to empires suggests. this particular interpretation of  rome as being in-
strumental in transforming antiquity obviously has a double function within the 
contemporary imperial discourse or can ideally adopt two possible forms. to be 
more precise : the reference to rome can either point to the republican tradition 
of  the antiquity-versed american founding fathers or it can be reinvented as an 
66 m. meckler (ed.), classical Antiquity and the politics of  America : From George Washington to George 
W. Bush, Waco (tX) 2006.
67 J. riecker, « Das Geheimnis der Freiheit ist der mut ». Antike Vorbilder in der amerikanischen Außenpo-
litik von Theodore roosevelt bis Bill clinton, paderborn 2006. 
68 cf. malamud, Ancient rome and modern America, cit., 1, 258.
69 cited in riecker, « Das Geheimnis der Freiheit ist der mut », cit., 82 (transl.).
70 Vorländer, Die Gründer und die Klassiker, cit., 125 ; also cf. W. nippel, Antike oder moderne Freiheit ? 
Die Begründung der Demokratie in Athen und in der neuzeit, frankfurt/m. 2008 ; W.p. adams, republi-
kanische Verfassung und bürgerliche Freiheit. Die Verfassungen und politischen ideen der amerikanischen re-
volution, Darmstadt-neuwied 1973 ; r. meyert, Die Klassiker und die Gründer. Die rezeption politischen 
Ordnungsdenkens im Streit zwischen Federalists und Anti-Federalists, « Dresdner Beiträge zur politischen 
theorie und ideengeschichte » 2, Dresden 1999.
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independent category of  imperial thought, which then overtly or covertly breaks 
with the internal lines of  reception of  the founding fathers.
hence, in the reference to rome there is an aporia inherent in the question : is 
it ancient roman logic which, in the face of  current « imperial » challenges, leads 
to the comparison between rome and america ? or is it the american founding 
fathers’ republican-style reception of  antiquity which calls for a historical self-
comparison with a virtuous or deterrent rome, virtually path-dependent, as soon 
as there is the risk of  any internal or external threat to the nation ? in the former 
case, the reference to rome would have an analytical function aimed at tapping 
into and exploiting the historically imperial knowledge of  power. if  necessary, 
this could subsequently used as a form of  (self-)criticism. in terms of  the second 
possibility, the reference to rome would have a revitalising function for the de-
mocracy with the already intrinsic critical objective to address the threats to the 
american republic. so in the first case, rome would itself  constitute a category of  
thought, whereas in the second case the traditional american reception of  rome 
would be a category of  thought.
a break with american traditions, whatever shape this may take, can – by refer-
ring to the reception of  antiquity of  the founding fathers – be discussed and criti-
cized, ignored, contextualized, relativized or covered up without automatically 
losing its legitimizing impact. nothing has yet been said about the legitimizing 
quality of  these different receptions. this is because with both forms of  interpre-
tation, a re-appropriation or transforming adaptation of  the ancient repertoire 
is taking place, without leaving the patterns of  imperial interpretation. protago-
nists of  both sides are therefore able to present themselves through their line of  
argumentation as the better and more authentic americans who are more loyal 
to tradition. in other words : the references made to rome in the discourse on 
an American empire use the persuasive power of  historical comparisons. Yet, this 
still begs the question of  which interpretation of  ancient rome characterizes the 
reception of  antiquity : the original one or that of  the founding fathers. in at-
tempting to answer this, both lines of  thought move away from historical truth 
or traditionalist path dependence. this also distinguishes the current imperial dis-
course as a project of  elites. of  course, the crux of  the matter is that those who, 
on closer examination, do not (like the founding fathers) consider rome to be a 
role model, still require background knowledge about empires.
it is in this field of  tension that the potential for theoretical transformation 
and practical innovation of  the current american imperial discourse lies. Yet, it 
is precisely this openness to interpretation which makes the imperial discourse 
within the Usa and its often ambivalent language suitable for description as a 
discourse of  crisis. evidently, a common language and the corresponding political 
stakeholders are missing which could help to make political reality more tangible 
and to legitimize it. Yet the political challenge contained in this question of  iden-
tity would be completely underestimated if  the imperial discourse was only con-
cerned with trying to interpret or find the true reception of  antiquity by means of  
discussion, rather than regarding this as an issue of  examining a conflict of  iden-
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tity. this has to do with the fact that it cannot be exploited any longer in the con-
text of  the traditional, non-imperial republican up to clear anti-imperial national 
discourse, which is why these issues could shake the cornerstones of  american 
self-understanding. and this crisis is even made both clearer and more confusing 
by the fact that, for example, some famous neo-conservatives are united in the 
« project for the new American century », while some left-wing liberals and critical 
republicans are members of  the « American empire project ». 71 in conclusion, three 
examples for these empire-specific transformative receptions of  antiquity, which 
are generally supported, will be examined.
iv.
numerous themes can be used for the purpose of  roman-imperial self-portray-
als. these range from every empire’s belief  in its own to issues regarding internal 
political-republican stability and imperial peace, to the problem of  decadence. 
applied to the Usa, such themes would correspondingly relate to democratic 
exceptionalism or the latest « redux » version 72 of  an « imperial presidency », 73 to 
the « pax americana » 74 or to an imperial decline through the loss of  republican 
virtues. 75 these and other topoi referred to in all receptions of  ancient rome, 
are constructed in such a way that they are mutually dependent : the question 
of  the virtuousness of  domestic politics, for instance, depends on the credibility 
of  the « imperial mission » 76 and thus on the ability of  an empire to be governed 
centrally in a responsible and stable manner. should virtue turn into hubris, peace 
will fail, it will be impossible to keep the periphery pacified without too much 
effort and the empire will become overstretched. consequently, anti-imperial re-
sistance arises and the imperial elite becomes reluctant to cover the rising costs of  
the imperial project. it therefore increasingly engages « barbaric » mercenaries in 
its army, thus shifting the imperial leadership competence towards the estranged 
periphery whose power-hungry and disparate « proconsuls » ultimately drive the 
empire into political, military, economic and cultural ruin.
these imperial patterns reveal tipping points, which – at least as far as the cur-
rent publications discussing the main themes of  the discourse on the American 
empire go – see ancient rome less as an unchanged role model and much more as 
a warning sign. three of  these tipping points are democracy (res publica), peace 
71 http ://www.newamericancentury.org/ and http ://www.americanempireproject.com/ [ac-
cessed october 19, 2010].
72 s. schreyer, imperial presidency redux ? Die institutionelle machtbalance zwischen Terrorbekämpfung 
und präventivkrieg, in J. hills - J. Wilzewski (eds.), Defekte Demokratie – crusader State ? Die Weltpolitik 
in der Ära Bush, trier 2008, 111-140.
73 a.m. schlesinger Jr., The imperial presidency. With a new introduction, new York 2004 ; a. ruda-
levige, The new imperial presidency : renewing presidential power after Watergate, ann arbor (mi) 2005.
74 a. parchami, Hegemonic peace and empire. The pax romana, Britannica and Americana, london 
2009.
75 K. fischer, political momentum and Long-range effects of  the pattern of  Decadence (forthcoming 
2011). 76 see münkler, empires, cit.
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(pax) and expansion (imperialist extension). referring back to the inadequacies 
and risks of  these, an argumentative course is often set, particularly in connec-
tion with the discourse on the American empire, which practically takes a single 
interpretation of  the empire, thus making it nearly impossible to detect any con-
tradiction with regard to the roman-imperial antiquity or the reception of  the 
antiquity by the founding fathers.
the most well-known topos of  such an « improving » adaptation of  the antiquity 
is the abandonment of  the supposedly inevitable juxtaposition of  the republic and 
the imperium. Both with regard to ancient rome and the Usa, this antagonism 
was traditionally seen as a balance between presenting oneself  internally as a re-
public and externally as an empire. 77 harvard historian eric robertson pointed 
out that « what seems like an obvious contradiction to us, to celebrate equality 
and freedom at home while engaging in despotic rule over others abroad, was 
simply the way things worked to the athenians ». 78 even though that may be true 
the athenian formation didn’t face itself  as a contradiction. the Usa, in con-
trast, faces such a challenge since the time of  its foundation, so that part of  the 
discourse on empires is to understand as a mere roman predicament. and mean-
while, the most recent discussions on empires reveal a significant transformation 
from the traditional view that empires have to become and to act « undemocratic 
by definition ». 79 What is most remarkable about this move away from the original 
view, in terms of  a transformative understanding of  antiquity, is that the deeply 
entrenched and yet critical tendency, especially among the neo-conservatives, to 
exaggerate and over-emphasize military power, 80 is only complemented by seri-
ous warnings of  various kinds voiced by leftist liberals against so-called hubris. 81 
military power is often immanently interpreted to be an « imperial burden » by 
representatives of  both the conservative and the liberal traditions, 82 which carries 
the risk of  both a « blowback » from the peripheries against the mother country 
and the appearance of  an american caesar or proconsuls. 83 the self-confidence 
which comes with being a superpower of  unimaginable strength is reinforced, in 
particular, by emphasizing the fact that this power needs to be handled responsi-
bly in order to secure it. in this case, the imperial burden is evidently not that of  
77 cf. J. petras - m. morley, empire or republic ? American Global power and Domestic Decay, new 
York 1995.
78 e.W. robinson, American empire ? Ancient reflections on modern American power, cW 99, 2005, 
35-50, 50.
79 c. tilly, How empires end, in K. Barkey - m. von hagen (eds.), After empire. multiethnic Societies 
and nation-Building. The Soviet Union and the russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg empires, Boulder (co) 
1997, 1-11 ; see also Biskamp, Die Dramaturgie demokratischer imperien, cit.
80 e.g. J.J. hentz (ed.), The Obligation of  empire. United States’ Grand Strategy for a new century, 
lexington (KY) 2004 ; Kagan, Dangerous nation, cit.
81 e.g. n. chomsky, Hegemony or Survival, new York 2003 ; m. ignatieff, empire Amerika ?, in speck 
- sznaider, empire Amerika, cit., 2003a, 15-37.
82 e.g. e.W. lefever, America’s imperial Burden. is the past prologue ?, oxford 1999.
83 c. Johnson, Blowback, Second edition : The costs and consequences of  American empire, new York 
2003.
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the « white man’s » mission civilisatrice, which the British author rudyard Kipling 
sought to assign to the Usa in his famous poem. in today’s empire discourse, the 
imperial burden has instead become much more of  a domestic issue : outwardly, 
by contrast, a veritable charm offensive is launched, spanning all political posi-
tions, which is sugar-coated with euphemistic qualifiers : « empire by invitation », 84 
« liberal empire », 85 « consensual empire », 86 « empire of  trust », 87 « benevolent em-
pire ». 88 or the guidebook What would the Founders do ?, a variation on the concept 
What would Jesus do ?, with no ironic undertone intended, points out – when it 
comes to the question whether « the founders would fear an american empire ? » : 
« [n]one [of  them] doubted that america could be an empire and a republic at the 
same time ». 89
this peculiarity cannot be merely ascribed to the differences between the ro-
man republic and a modern democracy. 90 What is more decisive is the associa-
tion that is established in both periods to various models of  peace. it is therefore 
important to stress that the perceptions of  domestic political rule in the antiquity 
were elitist and exclusive, whereas in modern, democratic and peace-oriented 
thinking, they tend to be more universal and expansive. 91 this distinction was 
even applied to the British empire : « [W]hereas the Victorian/edwardian pax Bri-
tannica was to be lauded as the peace of  the British empire, the pax Americana was 
to be global in scale ; whereas the pax Britannica had been identified with British 
rule and with the task of  civilizing ‘backward’ races, pax Americana is striking in 
both its ambition and in its universalism ». 92 the idea of  achieving a pax Americana 
by means of  democratization is therefore as necessarily paradox as is the theory 
of  « Democratic peace » itself : the concept of  a peaceful world order may include 
belligerent components, whenever the purpose is to make the world « safe for 
democracy » (Woodrow Wilson). Yet, in terms of  a transformed understanding 
of  antiquity, this enables those pursuing the american mission of  democratizing 
the world to compare themselves with the « Golden age » of  imperial rome 93 and 
to use and adapt this in the traditional « empire of  liberty » and « empire of  freedom » 
language accordingly, which is frequently found in politically missionary and ex-
pansionist references, such as with the federalists or with thomas Jefferson. 94
84 initially coined by G. lundestad, empire by invitation ? The United States and Western europe, 1945-
1952, « Journal of  peace research » 23, 1986, 263-277. 85 ferguson, colossus, cit.
86 maier, Among empires, cit. 87 madden, empires of  Trust, cit.
88 r. Kagan, Benevolent empire, « foreign policy » 111, 1998, 24-35.
89 r. Brookhiser, What Would the Founders Do ? Our Questions, Their Answers, new York 2006, 126.
90 remarked on by nippel, Antike oder moderne Freiheit, cit. ; cf. r. Balot, polybius’ Advice to the impe-
rial republic, « political theory » 38, 2010, 483-509.
91 s. huhnholz - K. fischer, Amnesie und Antizipation. ein politiktheoretischer Versuch zum pro-
blem von nachkriegsordnungen, « Behemoth » 3, 2010, 49-74, http ://www.oldenbourg-link.com/doi/
pdf/10.1524/behe.2010.0004 [accessed september 13, 2010], 54-59.
92 parchami, Hegemonic peace and empire, cit., 170. 93 madden, empires of  Trust, cit.
94 more on this in p.s. onuf, Jefferson’s empire. The Language of  American nationhood, charlottesvil-
le (va) 2000 ; r.a. van alstyne, The rising American empire, new York 1974 ; Wehler, Der Aufstieg des 
amerikanischen imperialismus, cit.
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the idea of  expansionism provides a third and final example. the issue of  po-
litical expansion, military conquest and the imperial stabilization of  regions goes 
back all the way to antiquity. 95 Yet a new argument has arisen in the American em-
pire discourse, particularly among opponents of  the empire debate : namely that 
empires of  the antiquity and later periods define themselves through the direct 
and even sovereign control of  colonies, provinces and foreign territories. 96 one 
need only to look at the creole administration in the former « new World » of  
latin america, or refer to the United Kingdom’s system of  « indirect rule », or to 
the more recent use of  the terms « satellite states » or « puppet regimes » to find 
evidence that this statement is false. Both the majority of  continental empires and 
most of  the sea, overseas and trading empires have always made use of  a variety 
of  domination policies, of  which direct rule was only ever one option. 97 though 
this opposing theory of  land occupation provides a thrilling argument, it plainly 
ignores the possibility of  learning from the history of  empires by explicitly refer-
ring to it.
in 1779, at a ripe old age, Benjamin franklin presented his remarkable « politi-
cal, miscellaneous, and philosophical pieces ». Dating back to 1774, his « rules for 
reducing a Great empire to a small one » (sequence number 28) provide a rather 
mocking view of  the British. 98 franklin recommends not incorporating the dis-
tant « provinces » of  an empire too heavily into the system of  the « mother coun-
try ». this, he says with biting sarcasm, would make it easier to rid oneself  of  it, 
reduce the risk of  separation, and avoid competition at eye level. franklin uses the 
rather abstruse image of  a large cake to illustrate this, which would fall apart if  
one didn’t, as a clever baker, cut off  the protruding edges.
like so many of  his contemporaries, franklin obviously had a political sense 
for the dialectics of  « imperial overstretch » on the one hand, and the « augustan 
threshold », on the other. 99 however, franklin was influenced by ciceronian, heav-
95 K. raaflaub, city-State, Territory and empire in classical Antiquity, in J. emlen - a. molho - K. 
raaflaub (eds.), Athens and rome, Florence and Venice : city-States in classical Antiquity and medieval 
italy, ann arbor (mi) 1991, 565-588.
96 cf. e.g. e. todd, After empire. The Breakdown of  the American Order, new York 2003, and Zelikow, 
The Transformation of  national Security, cit., 18 ss. this ultimately reflects a limitation, which is parti- 
cularly regarded by political imperial critics as being quite unique, perhaps even abstruse. in general, 
empires are inherently weak states (h.-h. nolte [ed.], imperien. eine vergleichende Studie, schwalbach 
[ts.] 2008, 13 ; osterhammel, Die Verwandlung der Welt, cit. ; madden, empires of  Trust, cit., xiv), al-
though the term « weak » does not imply « falling apart » here, nor does it refer to the idea of  a « fail-
ing » or « failed state ». rather, it entails the idea of  incoherence, instability or « vulnerability » (c.a. 
Kupchan, The Vulnerability of  empire, ithaca [nY] 1994) : « of  all political power structures, the empire 
is simultaneously the most potent and the most unstable » (Garrison, America as empire, cit., 100). 
97 one could also simply argue in a radical, decisionist way, as carl schmitt did, for instance, that 
de facto sovereignty depends on a power that has the ability to create and influence exceptional cir-
cumstances (c. schmitt, politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre der Souveränität, Berlin 1993). then 
the constitutional form of  formally independent and sovereign states says little about the actually 
constitutional reality of  a satellite state, which was merely tolerated by the empire.
98 B. franklin, political, miscellaneous, and philosophical pieces, london 1779, 343 ss.
99 the so-called « augustan threshold », as Doyle coined it (empires, cit., 93), refers to the fact 
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ily expansionist components of  the ancient concept of  mandate, imperium. 100 the 
latter cannot unreservedly be applied to all empires, since the sea empires or the 
« post-territorial empire », as charles s. maier calls the Usa, 101 generally operate via 
military bases and trading points or their control of  them.
these polemic and critical views of  land occupation and loss have clearly been 
internalized in contemporary american thinking, compared with the times of  
Benjamin franklin. this is apparent from the fact that the harshest critics of  im-
perial thinking today do not criticize the lure of  territorial conquest, so much as 
today’s reborn roman ideology of  « defensive imperialism » 102 and the irrespon-
sible « incoherence » of  the undertakings : « [t]he new imperialists do not want to 
rule permanently over foreign lands. they want only an indirect and informal 
empire, though one that threatens, coerces and even sometimes invades foreign 
states, improves them and then leaves ». 103 meanwhile, the opponents have recog-
nized what ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde remarked about the eU : « Uninhibited 
expansion leads to a weakening rather than a strengthening of  the ability to take 
political action by causing an excessive amount of  pressure from problems and 
involvement – weakening through overstretch ». 104
so if, among many others, George W. Bush provides the supposedly logical 
argument that « america has no empire to extend or utopia to establish. [… it has] 
no territorial ambitions. We don’t seek an empire », then this is a political state-
ment that is by no means in opposition to the theoretical assumptions on empires 
but knows very well how to take advantage of  them. 105 Yet, as in the case of  obama 
that, at its core, an empire relies on the appeal of  taking a varied approach in its management of  
the peripheries, i.e. from the rejection of  apparent foreign rule and exploitation to the stronger par-
ticipation of  the peripheries in central decisions, privileges and mutually binding obligations, to the 
partial delegation of  administrative and organizational concerns. an imperial « overstretch », accord-
ing to Kennedy (The rise and Fall of  Great powers, cit.), describes the affliction of  an empire caused 
by overstretching its imperial capacity over too large a number of  locations and activity posts, and 
overtaxing its personnel and military and economic resources, so that it is ultimately not able to or 
appears not to be able to meet its obligations. (for a combined analysis of  both concepts münkler, 
empires, cit.) 
100 J. fisch - D. Groh - r. Walther, imperialismus, in o. Brunner - W. conze - r. Koselleck (eds.), 
Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, iV, stutt-
gart 2004 (1982), 171-236, 172. 101 maier, Among empires, cit., 277.
102 adler, post-9/11 Views of  rome, cit.
103 m. mann, The incoherent empire, london 2003, 27.
104 e.-W. Böckenförde, nein zum Beitritt der Türkei, « frankfurter allgemeine Zeitung » 289 (De-
cember 10), 2004, 35 and 37 (transl.).
105 if  this standard had really been set, then the Usa would have already been one of  the fastest 
expanding empires in the world history in its early beginnings (cf. osterhammel, Die Verwandlung 
der Welt, cit., 607 ss. ; D. Junker, power and mission. Was Amerika antreibt, freiburg i.Br. 2003 ; h.-h. 
nolte [ed.], Geschichte der USA i. Von der entstehung bis zum Ausgang des 19. Jahrhunderts, schwalbach 
[ts.] 2006 ; m. Boot, The Savage Wars of  peace. Small Wars and the rise of  American power, new York 
[nY] 2002 ; graphically adapted and more sharply defined for an « internal empire » in h. Zinn - m. 
Konopacki - p. Buhle, A people’s History of  American empire. A Graphic Adaptation, new York 2008), 
although hobsbawm (On empire, cit., 73) did insist that the American empire was only « the logical 
by-product of  this [american] form of  expansion across a continent ».
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mentioned above, this makes everything more complicated when Bush continues 
with implicitly empire-missionary arguments of  not seeking to establish an em-
pire because « [o]ur nation is committed to freedom for ourselves and for others ». 106
the imperial topoi of  democracy, peace and expansion individually undergo 
a transformation of  their understanding of  antiquity, as for instance in the ex-
amples mentioned above, and only have argumentative clout because they are 
merged into a single pattern of  imperial interpretation where they mutually sup-
port each other. especially the traditional topos of  fearing an internal empire, a 
dictatorship lead by an american caesar or emperor, seems to perfectly under-
mine a widespread self-description as a full spectrum empire, which expands its 
influence not only for freedom, justice, liberation, and peace. that is why ex-
ceptionalism and selected receptions of  antiquity constitute a feasible pattern of  
imperial interpretation.
v.
even the phrase of  having an empire in which the sun never sets, which dates 
back to Karl V, has long been used by the United states Department of  De-
fence. 107 so the idea of  an American empire is not really new to anyone anymore. 
in fact, it sometimes disappears altogether behind the matter-of-fact way in which 
conventional, imperial topoi and traditional american master narratives are inter-
woven with one another. this « double-edged sword » of  exceptionalism 108 – i.e. 
the conviction popularized by the puritan John Winthrop of  being a new Jerusa-
lem, « a city upon a hill » invoked in the Sermon on the mount, which was to shine 
upon the world 109 – has constantly been expanded to include perfectly matching 
myths such as the frontier, manifest destiny and the individual pursuit of  happiness. 
these have meanwhile merged into the cultural amalgamation of  the American 
Dream, 110 into Americanism 111 and into the values-based civilization conglomer-
ate of  the Free World. 112 also the « Wilsonian syndrome » that is a famous charac-
teristic of  american foreign policy, and which raymond aron called the « swing 
between crusading and withdrawal into isolation », 113 has always been a feature of  
106 excerpts of  speeches held in June and november 2002, quoted in m. ignatieff, The American 
empire ; The Burden, « new York times », Jan. 5, 2003, new York edition, part 6, 22.
107 Kagan, Dangerous nation, cit., 29.
108 s.m. lipset, American exceptionalism. A double-edged sword, new York-london 1996.
109 mt. 5, 14 ; cf. also Bacevich, neues rom, neues Jerusalem, cit., 71-82.
110 W. fluck, Kultur, in p. lösche (ed.), Länderbericht USA, Bonn 2008, 712-814 ; h. paul, The myth 
That made America. An introduction to American Studies, Bielefeld 2011 (forthcoming).
111 m. Kazin - J.a. mccartin (eds.), Americanism. new perspectives on the History of  an ideal, chapel 
hill (nc) 2006.
112 t.G. ash, Free World : America, europe, and the Surprising Future of  the West, new York 2004.
113 aron, The imperial republic, cit., xvii ; K. schwabe, Weltmacht und Weltordnung. Amerikanische 
Außenpolitik von 1898 bis zur Gegenwart, paderborn 2006 ; Kagan, Dangerous nation, cit.
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imperial thinking. alan posener even speaks of  a « periodically returning collec-
tive aDhD syndrome ». 114
none of  this is new. What is new is the discernibly fast disappearing fear of  the 
intellectual elites to refer to the American empire as imperium Americanum or as a 
conceivable new rome and thus to depart from conventional partisan politics. ob-
viously one expects this to offer greater legitimization or analytical added value. 
public political rhetoric may avoid making affirmative comparisons with ancient 
rome, and with empires in general, but nevertheless clearly takes a position on 
them. furthermore, by strictly denying any resemblance, american politicians 
are unwittingly confirming the disputed patterns of  imperial interpretation.
even though imperial rome may not be politically useful, as a category of  po-
litical reflection it is analytically necessary. in itself, ancient rome is not automati-
cally more useful than subsequent empires in history (the possible function of  po-
litical legitimization of  comparable analytical references to other empires needs 
to be further investigated in more detail). at least at present, ancient rome is 
obviously not suitable as a legitimizing model of  interpretation that is compatible 
with democratic thinking. the intellectual engagement with and adaptation or 
americanization of  tipping points and examples of  the romans’ ability to master 
crises, and sometimes to relativize this in relation to other empires, is therefore 
all the more conspicuous. What is also remarkable is the matter-of-fact attitude 
with which one has recently begun to turn the traditional mirror discourse sur-
rounding the downfall of  the roman republic into a comparison of  oneself  with 
the imperial rome and its imperial decline. however, there is obviously still a lack 
of  appropriate adaptations of  the completely different reception of  antiquity by 
the founding fathers. it could therefore well be that the recent extension of  the 
discourse on the American empire to other empires than the roman one were im-
plicitly intended to bypass the analytically and legitimately risky comparison with 
traditional american receptions of  antiquity.
this confirms the assumption that we have become historical witnesses of  an 
internal american discourse that is only starting to take shape, in which the exper-
tise on empires is being adapted and systemized, and shaping the political opinion 
of  american politicians and the american political public. it remains to be seen 
whether this process will be successful and this cannot be gauged simply on the 
basis of  a « change » heralded by a new president or from the clear rejection of  the 
manichean, foreign policy style of  the last Bush administration.
on the basis of  the observations, classifications and contemplations presented, 
we can conclude that the issue of  the American empire does indeed follow in the 
footsteps of  the roman logic, and thus the imperial challenge. it is not primar-
ily to be understood as the familiar reflex, which in view of  any risks dresses the 
american republic in a traditional, quasi-discursive toga in order to assure itself  
114 a. posener, imperium der Zukunft. Warum europa Weltmacht werden muss, Bonn 2007, 197 
(transl.).
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of  the reception of  antiquity established by the founding fathers. on the con-
trary, this bears the potential for considerable political tension. one might gain 
the impression that the recently emphasized, uninterrupted neoclassical line of  
tradition in the Usa emphasizes ancient rome as the « iconic empire » in order to 
symbolically hide the political divide between the early republican reception of  
antiquity and today’s imperial interest in antiquity.
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